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The Study Group on Market Liquidity, under the auspices of the Euro-currency Standing Committee
(now the Committee on the Global Financial System), conducted a survey, using a common
questionnaire, on the structural features of eleven government securities markets; Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, based on the understanding that degree of market liquidity is at least partly affected by
market structure.
This paper is a summary of the survey results, focusing on the interesting features of each government
securities market from the viewpoint of market liquidity. The features are summarised and compared
across countries in terms of (1) degree of market liquidity, (2) market microstructure, (3) transparency,
i.e. availability of price and volume information, (4) market fragmentation, (5) information extraction
from yield curves, and (6) market surveillance.
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1. Introduction
Central banks have much interest in the liquidity of government securities market. This is partly
because government securities markets are where central banks conduct open market operations and
extract information on market participants’ expectations regarding the future course of the economy,
especially future inflation rates. In addition, a deep and liquid government securities market is also
important for central banks from the viewpoint of macro-prudential policy. This is because, when the
market is sufficiently deep and liquid, private financial institutions may be able to raise necessary
funds through the market, and thus the lender of last resort functions of central banks are called upon
only when truly needed.
While it is not easy to pinpoint what determines market liquidity, it is safe to say that degree of market
liquidity is at least partly affected by market structure. In this sense, it may be worth examining the
structural features of government securities markets from a viewpoint of market liquidity. Against this
background, the Study Group on Market Liquidity, under the auspices of the Euro-Currency Standing
Committee (now the Committee on the Global Financial System) of the Bank for International
Settlements, conducted a survey based on a common questionnaire on the structure of government
securities markets.
1 In addition to the five member countries of the Study Group, i.e. Canada, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, six non-member countries joined the survey,
i.e. Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.
2
The objective of this paper is to highlight interesting features of government securities markets based
on contributions from the eleven countries, as well as to provide issues for future study regarding
market liquidity. In this sense, this paper does not intend to indicate that the market of any specific
country is “better” than that of other countries.
This paper’s structure is as follows: in Section  2, the degrees of market liquidity are broadly
summarised; in Section 3, the microstructure of each national market is described; in Section 4, the
degree of transparency is compared across national markets; in Section 5, factors affecting the degree
of market fragmentation are analysed; in Section 6, the role of government securities is discussed in
the context of extracting information from yield curves, and in Section 7, several measures for market
surveillance are described.
2. Degree of market liquidity
It may be useful to start with a brief overview of the degree of market liquidity in each of the surveyed
countries. There are various ways to measure market liquidity, each of which captures a certain aspect
of market liquidity. In this paper, due to availability of data through the questionnaire, two measures
are highlighted. First, one of the simple and primitive measures is turnover ratios, which are the ratios
of yearly trading volume against outstanding volume. Second, in order to estimate the degree of
market liquidity, it may be interesting to compare bid-ask spreads because the spreads are a more
direct measure of market liquidity.
1 The compendium of questionnaire results is attached to Part 1 (overview) of the report of the Study Group. The data in
this paper and the compendium are as of the end of 1997 or in 1997. However, some important institutional changes since
then have been incorporated and are indicated accordingly.
2  Under such circumstances, each table in this paper is composed of two panels, each of which covers the five member




While the degree of market liquidity differs according to maturity or whether securities are benchmark
or non-benchmark, it may be worthwhile to obtain a rough overview of the liquidity conditions in each
market by comparing the turnover ratios for the overall market. Turnover ratios are defined as
yearly-trading volume divided by outstanding volume.
4
Among the countries surveyed, the turnover ratios range from 3 to 34. The ratios are high in Canada,
the US France, and Sweden. The ratios are low in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
5
While this section aims to compare the degree of market liquidity for cash government securities
markets, it may be interesting, for reference purposes, to compare the trading volume of futures
markets. Futures market trading volume is largest in the US followed by Japan. Other countries have
relatively small futures markets. The cash-futures ratio, measured by cash trading volume divided by
futures trading volume, is greater than one in all countries except Japan and the UK This may imply
something about the relative degree of market liquidity between the cash and futures markets.
Table 1
Turnover ratio
CAN ITA JPN UK US
Volume outstanding (a)
1 285 1,100 1,919 458 3,457
Yearly trading volume (b)
2 6,243 8,419 13,282 3,222 75,901
Turnover ratio (b) / (a) 21.9 7.7 6.9 7.0 22.0
(reference) Yearly trading volume
in futures market (c) 185 2,036 18,453 3,294 27,928
Cash / futures ratio (b) / (c) 33.7 4.1 0.7 1.0 2.7
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Volume outstanding (a)
1 232 551 563 176 111 35





Turnover ratio (b) / (a) 4.1 33.8 n.a. 2.6 32.7 3.6
<reference> Yearly trading volume
in futures market (c) 28 n.a. n.a. not exist 1,137 90
Cash / futures ratio (b) / (c) 33.8 n.a. n.a. - 3.2 1.4
1    The figures are for the end of 1997, in billions of US dollars, converted at 1997 year-end exchange rates
(US$1 = US$1.43  =  ITL1,770  =  ¥130 = BEF37.1 = FFr6.02 = DM1.80 = Dfl2.03 = SKr7.93 = SFr1.46,
£1 = US$1.65).   
2  The figures are for the 1997 calendar year, in billions of US dollars, converted at the same exchange
rates as above. Trading volume is calculated on a two-way basis, i.e. when dealer A sells a US$100 security to dealer B, a
US$200 transaction is recorded, as opposed to US$100.     
3  The figures may include trading other than outright
transactions, such as repos or buy/sell backs.
3  In the tables in this paper, the name of each country is abbreviated as follows. CAN for Canada, ITA for Italy, JPN for
Japan, BEL for Belgium, FRA for France, GER for Germany, NEL for the Netherlands, SWE for Sweden, and SWI for
Switzerland.
4  In this analysis, total outstanding volume of all marketable securities is used as the denominator. However, when the
government or the central bank effectively take a large portion of marketable securities out of circulation, the effective
turnover ratios could be higher than those shown in Table  1. For example, the ratio for Japan would be 12.9, if
government and central bank holdings are subtracted from the denominator. See page 17 for a discussion on government
and central bank holdings.
5  The aggregate turnover ratio for the so-called Euroland, i.e.  Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, is 13.8.
(Germany is not included in this calculation because its trading volume is not available).4
2.2 Bid-ask spreads
Smaller bid-ask spreads indicate higher market liquidity. In this sense, it is meaningful to compare
bid-ask spreads across countries. However, this is not as easy as it sounds, because actual market data
on spreads are unavailable in many countries. Therefore, the quotes for which spreads are calculated,
applicable for a trade size of US$10 million, need to be estimated by each central bank. In this sense,
the spreads may not be completely comparable across countries.
Having said that, bid-ask spreads for on-the-run issues,
6 quoted in price terms, tend to be larger for
securities with longer original maturities, as a reflection of larger price risk. Also, while the level of
bid-ask spreads seems to significantly differ across countries, the spreads are the smallest in the US
market for all original maturities. Specifically, the smaller spreads in the US market are pronounced
for securities of longer original maturities.
Japan is the only exception to the pattern of wider spreads for longer maturities. In Japan, the spreads
for 10  year bonds are smaller than those for 6-year bonds. This may be a reflection of the
concentration of liquidity in 10-year bonds in the Japanese market.
Table 2
Bid-ask spread for on-the-run-issues
1
CAN ITA JPN UK US
2 years 2 3531 . 6
5 years 5 59
2 41 . 6
10 years 5 6743 . 1
Fixed coupon
30 years 10 41 6
3 83 . 1
Index-linked 10 years 25 not exist not exist 15 6.3
B E LF R AG E RN E LS W ES W I
2 years n.a. 44 not exist 4 not exist
5 years n.a. 54 n.a. 9 not exist
10 years 5 10 4 n.a. 15 10
Fixed coupon
30 years n.a. 24 10 n.a. 27
4 25
Index-linked 10 years not exist not exist not exist not exist 39 not exist
1  The table shows bid-ask spreads for on-the-run issues. The spreads, given in one-hundredths of a currency unit for the
face amount of 100 currency units, apply to interdealer transactions.   
2  For 6-year bonds.   
3  For 20-year bonds.   
4  For
22-year bonds.
3. Market microstructure – in pursuit of better price discovery
3.1 Dealer market vs. auction-agency market
7
Broadly speaking, two types of trading system exist in the secondary market for government
securities: dealer markets and auction-agency markets. In dealer markets, dealers supply immediacy of
trade by continuously providing bid and/or ask quotations. In this sense, they are called “quote-driven
6 Most recently issued securities for each original maturity.
7  For detailed characteristics of each market, see Dattels [1995].5
markets”. In auction-agency markets, buy-orders and sell-orders are matched by a centralised auction
agency. Therefore, they are called “order-driven markets”.
8
In general, dealer markets are common for cash trading, and auction-agency markets are common for
futures trading. However, there are several exceptions. For example, in Italy, most cash customer
transactions are conducted in the auction-agency market (MOT), but long bond futures contracts are
traded in the dealer market (MIF).
9 In Switzerland, nearly half of cash customer trading is conducted
at the auction-agency market (SWX). Another interesting exception is Japan where a majority of
interdealer trading is intermediated by brokers who play the role of an auction agency.
Table 3
Market structure
CAN ITA JPN UK US
customer DAD
1 D D Cash market
interdealer
2 DD
3 A and D D D
Futures market
4 5 A and D
6 A
5 5




1 D and A D D and A Cash market
interdealer
2 DD–A n.a. –
Futures market
4 AAAN o t  e x i s tAA
Note: D – dealer market, A – auction-agency market.
1  Auction-agency markets exist, but their share in trading volume is marginal (not more than 10%).   
2   Applies to trading
intermediated by interdealer brokers (IDBs).   
3  Applies to trading on the MTS, a specialised trading system for interdealer
transactions.   
4  The structure shown applies to the main session, and not to evening or overnight session. Foreign markets
are only shown when trading volume is larger in the foreign market than in the domestic market.   
5  The structure is
somewhere between dealer market and auction agency market. It is a continuous auction-agency market, but no order-book
exists. The incoming orders are routed to floor traders, and then matched bilaterally between floor traders who
continuously “scream out” their buy or sell prices.   
6  Auction-agency market in the foreign market (LIFFE) and dealer
market in the domestic market (MIF).
3.2 Order matching system in auction-agency market
How orders should be matched in an auction-agency market is an area which has drawn the attention
of authorities trying to make their markets more attractive. Traditionally, in most markets, orders were
manually matched on the floor of the trading pit (open-outcry trading). However, thanks to the
development of information technology, electronic processing has become possible. The benefits of
electronic trading seem to be (1) increased speed of price discovery by quick execution which reduces
the risk of price fluctuations, (2)  operational efficiency by eliminating manual paperwork, and
(3) extending the geographical reach of the market through the possibility of remote trading.
Because of these benefits, more and more futures markets are turning to electronic trading to remain
competitive not only across exchanges, but also with OTC markets and new styles of electronic
trading systems.
10 The LIFFE in the UK and the CBOT and the CME in the US are examples of such
efforts. In these exchanges, open outcry trading has been the norm, but they are now shifting to
electronic trading.
8  In most cases, exchanges play the role of auction agencies.
9  Italian bond futures contracts are also traded in the auction-agency market (LIFFE) in the UK
10 Examples include Instinet, Posit, and the Arizona Stock Exchange in the US equities market. Similar innovations may
occur in the government securities market in the future.6
Table 4
Order matching systems in auction-agency markets
11
CAN ITA JPN UK US
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customer –– –E–E Cash market
interdealer –– –E––
Futures market EE E–EE
Note: O - open-outcry, E - electronic.
1    In August  1998, the order matching system changed from an open outcry system to electronic trading.     
2  Electronic
trading is currently available for after-hours trading sessions, and the whole order-matching system is planned to be changed
in 1999.    
 3  Electronic trading is available for after-hours trading sessions.
3.3 Primary dealer systems
In government securities markets, governments raise funds and central banks conduct open market
operations. To facilitate such activities, primary dealer (PD) systems have been adopted in several
countries, where a group of dealers are designated as PDs by the Treasury or the central bank. Such
PDs have special rights such as greater access to primary market auctions, and in some cases, they are
treated as counterparties in open market operations. However, in return, they must comply with special
obligations such as active participation in primary auctions and market making in the secondary
market with a certain degree of tight bid-ask spreads. Because of the obligations in the secondary
market, the PD system can help enhance market liquidity.
Among the surveyed countries, all except Japan, Germany, and Switzerland have PD systems, but
whether the system is one-tier or two-tier differs from market to market. While a one-tier structure,
where there is no distinction among PDs, seems more popular, a two-tier structure is used in Canada
and Italy where certain PDs have elevated rights and obligations.
The obligations to bid in primary auctions and to report to central banks and/or Treasuries are imposed
in almost all countries which use PD systems. However, only Italy, the UK, Belgium, and France
impose obligation to quote.
3.4 Tick size
12
Tick size, the minimum increment in quoted prices/yields, may affect the level of market liquidity.
Too large a tick size is harmful to market liquidity because matching supply and demand for a security
would be more difficult with a large tick size. In addition, quoted bid-ask spreads, one measure of
market liquidity, cannot be smaller than the tick size. On the other hand, too small a tick size might not
enhance market liquidity either, because operational costs could increase with too small a tick size.
11 Table 4 applies only to auction-agency markets, since orders are not matched in dealer markets.
12 Tick size in OTC dealer market should be understood to be a pricing convention, because there is no entity, such as an
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Always No Yes –Y e s No




Tightness No Yes – Yes No
Obligation to bid in auctions
3 Yes Yes –Y e s Yes
Obligation to report
3 Yes Yes -– Yes Yes
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Always Yes Yes –N o No –




Tightness Yes Yes –N o No –
Obligation to bid in auctions
3 Yes Yes –Y e s Yes –
Obligation to report
3 Yes Yes –N o Yes –
1    The PD system in Canada was changed in 1998. Former PDs and jobbers are now called Government Securities
Distributors (GSDs) and (new) PDs, respectively. Their responsibilities were changed somewhat, but these changes do not
affect the table.   
2  From September 1998, a subset of 8 PDs have market-making obligations in index-linked securities,
too.   
3  In the table, obligation for Canada and Italy is for PDs with elevated status (jobbers <now PDs> – Canada, specialists
– Italy).   
4  A PD system was created in January 1999.
In cash markets, tick size differs significantly from country to country, ranging from 0.1/10,000 of
face value in Canada and Italy to 11/10,000 in Sweden. While securities are quoted in price terms in
most countries, all securities in Japan and Sweden, and securities with shorter maturities (5-year or
less) in France are quoted in yield terms. The size is the same irrespective of maturity in all markets
except Italy where zero coupon securities with an original maturity of 2 years or less are quoted with a
smaller tick size.
On the other hand, in futures markets, the standard for tick size seems to have converged to 1/10,000
of the notional face value, with the exception of the U.S and France.
Consequently, in Japan, the UK, and Sweden, tick size is significantly larger in the cash market than in
the futures market, while the opposite holds in Canada, Italy, the US, and France This difference may
imply something about the relative degree of market liquidity between the cash and futures markets.8
Table 6
Tick size
CAN ITA JPN UK US
customer 0.1 0.1 – 1
2 3 – 4
3 3.1
4 0.8 – 3.1 Cash market
1
interdealer 0.1 0.1 – 1
2 3 – 4
3 3.1
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customer 11  –  2
7 11 2 – 11
8 1 Cash market
1
interdealer 11  –  2




9 1N o t  e x i s t11
1   Tick size is shown in ten-thousandths of the face value of 100 currency units of each country.   
2  A tick size of 0.1/10,000
of face value applies to zero coupon securities with original maturities of 2 years or less, and that of 1/10,000 applies to other
securities.   
3  In Japan, securities are quoted in yield terms with a tick size of 0.5 bp, which can be converted to from about
3/10,000 to 4/10,000 of face value in price terms for the 10-year benchmark.   
4  In the UK, the tick size was 3.1/10,000
before gilts became quoted in decimals in 1998.   
5  Tick size is shown in ten-thousandths of the notional face value of 100
currency units of each country.   
6  This tick size applies to futures contracts for T-bonds and 10-year T-notes, which make up
the dominant share of all futures transactions.  
 7  In France, securities with an original maturity of 5 years or less (BTANs
and BTFs) are quoted in yield terms with a tick size of 0.5 bp, which can be converted to about 2/10,000 of face value for
5-year BTANs. Securities with an original maturity of 10 years or more (OATs) are quoted in price terms with a tick size of
1/10,000 of face value.   
8  In Sweden, securities are quoted in yield terms with a tick size of 1 bp, which can be converted to
anywhere between about 2/10,000 of face value (2-year benchmark) and 11/10,000 (16-year benchmark).   
9  This tick size
applies to 10-year contracts, which make up the dominant share of all futures transactions.
4. Transparency
4.1 Transparency in the secondary market
The relationship between market liquidity and transparency is complex. On the one hand, if the market
is too opaque and one cannot see the current market value of securities, investors may exit the market
because it would be very difficult to accurately value their portfolio. In this case, the depth of market
participants would be reduced, and thus market liquidity would be decreased. On the other hand, if the
market is too transparent and the information on order flows is perfectly disseminated, some large
investors may exit the market because they do not wish to reveal their identity when conducting
transactions for fear of possibly revealing private information about the traded securities.
13 In this
case, the depth of market participants would also be reduced, and thus market liquidity would also be
decreased. Making the issue more difficult to tackle, the appropriate level of transparency, i.e. what
type of information is available, and to what degree, may differ from market to market depending on
the nature of products being traded, as well as the environment surrounding the market.
4.1.1 Cash customer market
The overall degree of transparency in this market seems to be somewhat lower than in cash interdealer
and futures markets. The availability of information is highest in Italy, where the auction-agency can
handle the collection and dissemination of information. However, the degree of transparency is
generally lower in the other countries which use dealer markets where the collection and dissemination
13 In market microstructure theory, such large investors may be characterised as “informed traders”, who know more about
the true value of the security than other traders.9
of information is relatively difficult by nature. Also, a large number of traded products (issues) and the
variety of customers may have made it difficult to maintain transparency.
Table 7
Degree of transparency in cash customer market
14
CAN ITA JPN UK US
Type of info. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol.
Dealer/Public D P D PDPDPD P D PDPDPD P D P
more qts 0 0 0 010100 0 0 000001 1 0 0
best b-a 0 0 0 011110 0 0 010101 1 0 0
Pre-trade
freq. 0 0 0 011110 0 0 010101 1 0 0
history 0 0 0 011110 0 0 011111 1 1 1 Post-trade
freq. 0 0 0 011110 0 0 011111 1 1 1
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Type of info. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol.
Dealer/Public D P D PDPDPD P D PDPDPD P D PDPDP
more qts 1 1 0 000001 1 0 0 1 1 0 0000 0
best b-a 1 1 0 000001 1 0 0 1 1 0 0000 0
Pre-trade
freq. 1 1 0 000001 1 0 0 1 1 0 0000 0
history 0 0 0 000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000 0 Post-trade
freq. 0 0 0 0 00000 0 0 0
n.a.
0 0 0 0 000 0
Standards for grading
Type of info. Price information consists of quotes of bid-ask prices (pre-trade) and intraday price history
(post-trade).
Volume information consists of order sizes (pre-trade) and accumulated trading volume
(post-trade).
Dealer / Public Shows for whom the information is available. The cells below “D” and “P” show
information available to dealers and the public, respectively. For example, if information on
the best bid-ask price is available to dealers, but not released to the public, a 1 is put in the
cell below “D” and a 0 in the cell below “P”.
more qts (quotes) If price and volume information is available for more than the best bid-ask quotes = 1
If not = 0
best b-a If price and volume information is available for the best bid-ask quotes = 1
If not = 0
freq. If information is disseminated tick-by-tick on a real-time basis = 1
If not = 0
history If intraday price history and accumulated trading volume are available = 1
If not = 0
14 The data applies to OTC dealer markets, except for Italy, where an exchange-based customer market is dominant.10
4.1.2 Cash interdealer market
15
In the cash interdealer market intermediated by interdealer brokers (IDBs), the overall degree of
transparency is generally higher than the cash customer market, which could be a partial reflection of
the smaller number of intermediaries (IDBs) in this market than in the cash customer market.
A distinct feature of the market is that the pre-trade information in not publicly available except in
Italy and the US This is probably because dealers tend to keep pre-trade information within the
dealers’ community in order to make customer trading more profitable.
Table 8
Degree of transparency in cash interdealer market intermediated by IDBs
CAN ITA
1 JPN UK US
Type of info. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol.
Dealer/Public D P D PDPDPD P D PDPDPD P D P
more qts 0 0 0 011111 0 1 000000 0 0 0
best b-a 1 0 1 011111 0 1 010001 1 1 1
Pre-trade
freq. 1 0 1 011111 0 1 010001 1 1 1
history 0 0 0 011111 1 1 010101 1 1 1 Post-trade
freq. 0 0 0 011111 0 1 010101 1 1 1
BEL FRA GER
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Type of info. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol.
Dealer/Public D P D PDPDPD P D PDPDPD P D PDPDP
more qts 0 0 0 0 – – – –0000 0 0––– –
best b-a 0 0 0 0 – – – –1010 0 0––– –
Pre-trade
freq. 0 0 0 0 – – – –1010 0 0––– –
history 0 0 0 0 – – – –0011 0 0––– – Post-trade
freq. 0 0 0 0
n.a.











1  The transparency applies to the MTS.   
2  IDBs do not exist.
4.1.3 Futures market
The overall degree of transparency is generally higher in the futures market than in the cash market.
Differences in the degree of transparency across countries are the smallest. This may be because
traded products are highly standardised and traded in exchanges where collection and dissemination of
information is relatively easy.
15 Cash interdealer transactions are composed of direct transactions between dealers and transactions intermediated by
IDBs. For all countries except Italy, grading is based on the information availability in the IDB market. In Italy, where
interdealer brokers do not exist, grading is based on the information availability of the MTS.11
Table 9





Type of info. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol.
Dealer/Public D P D PDPDPD P D PDPDPD P D P
more qts 0 0 0 011111 0 1 000000 0 0 0
best b-a 1 1 1 111111 1 1 111111 1 1 1
Pre-trade
freq. 1 1 1 111111 1 1 111111 1 1 1
history 1 1 1 111111 1 1 111111 1 1 1 Post-trade
freq. 1 1 1 111111 1 1 111111 1 1 1
BEL FRA GER NEL
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Type of info. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol. Price Vol.
Dealer/Public D P D PDPDPD P D PDPDPD P D PDPDP
more qts 1 1 1 110101 0 1 0----1 0 1 0101 0
best b-a 1 1 1 111111 1 1 1----1 1 1 1111 1
Pre-trade
freq. 1 1 1 111111 1 1 1----1 1 1 1111 1
history 1 1 1 111111 1 1 1----1 1 1 1111 1 Post-trade
freq. 1 1 1 111111 1 1 1----1 1 1 1111 1
1  Applies to information on the MIF.   
3  Futures market does not exist.    
2  Applies to information on the regular open-
outcry floor trading.
4.2 Transparency in the primary market
In regard to the relationship between primary market transparency and secondary market liquidity, one
may conclude that higher transparency, i.e. the pre-announcement of primary auction information,
may increase market liquidity in the secondary market, and decrease governments’ debt funding costs.
First, if an auction schedule is announced in advance, it is possible to trade securities in the form of
when-if-issued trading even before the primary auction, if the authority permits.
16 In fact,
when-if-issued trading is conducted in seven of the surveyed countries. When such trading is
available, market liquidity for securities just after an auction (ordinary when-issued trading) or
issuance may be enhanced, as it may be easier for market makers to provide tight bid-ask quotations if
the true values of securities have been well tested in the market before the auction.
In addition, if an auction schedule is pre-announced, it is easier for auction participants to formulate
bidding strategies to construct optimal portfolios. This would attract more investors to the market,
which could help decrease governments’ debt funding costs. All the surveyed countries pre-announce
auction information such as dates, original maturities, and auctioned amounts.
A related issue is the announcement of coupon rates. In Canada and the US, coupon rates for new
issues are not announced before auctions. They are set just below the average subscribed yield so that
the subscription price of a security will be slightly less than par. This treatment could keep some
investors away because they cannot predict coupon cashflows, however this also could attract other
investors who hope to avoid redemption losses.
16 When-if-issued trading is conducted between the auction announcement day, usually several days before the auction, and
the auction day. Ordinary when-issued trading is conducted between the auction day and the issuance day.12
Table 10













Yes Yes No Yes Yes
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when-if-issued trading No Yes Yes No Yes No
1  Y – announced every year, SA – announced semi-annually, Q – announced quarterly, and D – announced several days
(less than one month) before auctions.   
2  Started to pre-announce auction information from March 1999.   
3  Applies to
announcements of tap-issuance schedules, because all issues are created on tap.
5. Market fragmentation
Government securities are fungible products compared to other debt instruments because there is only
one issuer per country. However, each issue is different in its coupon rate and maturity, so the
government securities market is also fragmented by nature. The degree of fragmentation is affected by
several factors, such as the distinction between on-the-run and off-the-run issues, the profile of
products, the profile of holders, and the institutional framework.
5.1 Fragmentation between on-the-run and off-the-run issues
The government securities market is fragmented between on-the-run securities and off-the-run
securities. On-the-run securities are the most recently issued securities, which become off-the-run
when a new issue is created for the same maturity.
There are strong preferences for on-the-run-issues. This is partly because their coupon rates tend to
near the current market rates, thus they are traded near par, which may attract some investors who do
not wish to incur redemption losses or gains. In addition, on-the-run issues provide the most suitable
hedging instruments for active market participants who conduct short-term trading. This is because
these securities are highly available, because a relatively short time has passed since issuance,
meaning fewer securities are in the hands of investors who employ buy-and-hold strategies.
Reflecting these preferences, the bid-ask spreads for on-the-run issues tend to be smaller than those for
off-the-run issues in most countries.13
Table 11
Comparison between on-the-run and off-the-run issues
1
CAN ITA JPN UK US
On-the-run or off-the-run On Off On Off On Off On Off On Off
5 years 5 13
2 589
3 11
3 44 1.6 6.3
10 years 5 16
2 687 744 3.1 6.3
Bid-ask spread –
remaining maturity
of 30 years 10 19
2 14 14 16
4 19
4 81 2 3.1 12.5
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
On-the-run or off-the-run On Off On Off On Off On Off On Off On Off
5 years n.a. n.a. 5 6 4 4 n.a. n.a. 9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
10 years 5 71 06 4 5 n.a. n.a. 15 n.a. 10 10
Bid-ask spread –
remaining
maturity of 30 years n.a. n.a. 24 10 10 10 n.a. n.a. 27
5 n.a. 25 n.a.
1  The table compares bid-ask spreads for on-the-run and just off-the-run issues having similar remaining maturities. The
spreads, given in one-hundredth of a currency unit for the face amount of 100 currency units, apply to interdealer
transactions of fixed coupon bonds. While the spreads are generally for a common trade size of US$10 million, the trade
size could differ significantly across markets. In addition, the data source differs according to market, i.e. actual market
data are accessible in some countries, but the spreads must be estimated by the central bank in other countries. In this
sense, the spreads are not completely comparable across countries.   2  The figure is the mid-point of a range.   3  For
6-year bonds.   4  For 20-year bonds.   5 For 22-year bonds.
5.2 Fragmentation by the profile of products
5.2.1 Maturity distribution
The number of original maturities has much to do with the degree of fragmentation. On the one hand,
a large number of original maturities would further fragment the market, because several securities of
different coupon rates with the same remaining maturity would coexist. On the other hand, investors
may not be able to find on-the-run securities to fit their needs, if too few original maturities are
available. In order to keep a good balance, each country has 5 (the UK) to 12 (Switzerland) original
maturities. In lists of original maturities, there seem to be “key maturities” for which most of the
countries issue securities; 3 and 6 months, 1, 2, 5, 10, and 30 years.
Even when an equal number of original maturities exists, the implication for market liquidity would be
different between cases where total outstanding volume is evenly distributed among each original
maturity, and cases where one original maturity takes a dominant share of the total outstanding
volume. Among the surveyed countries, the maturity distribution of Japan and the Netherlands is
distinctively skewed towards 10-year bonds, which may cause market fragmentation between 10-year
bonds and other securities.
The number of benchmarks, ranging from 1 in Japan to 12 in Sweden, seems to be related to the
maturity distribution.
17 The number seems to be larger when the volume outstanding is evenly
distributed among each original maturity.
18
17 Benchmarks are the most liquid issues for each sufficiently liquid original maturity. Whether an issue is a benchmark or
not is determined by market practice.
18 In cash markets, trading volume seems to be relatively evenly distributed among different original maturities. However,
in futures markets, trading volume is heavily concentrated in one of the maturities, mostly 10-year contracts, even when
several maturities are listed. The following are composition ratios for the most active maturity among all trading volume:
Canada – 96.2% (10-year), Italy – 99.9% (10-year), Japan – 98.4% (10-year), the UK – 100% (10-year), the US – 70.4%
(30-year), Belgium – 96.4% (10-year), and Switzerland – 96.9% (10-year).14
Table 12
Features of maturity distribution
19
CAN ITA JPN UK US
Number of original maturities 71 0857
1
Original maturities
(M – month, Y – year)
3, 6M,
1, 2, 5, 10,
30Y
3, 6M,
1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5,
7, 10, 30Y
3, 6M,
2, 4, 5, 6, 10,
20Y
3M,
5, 10, 20,    
30Y
3, 6M,
1, 2, 5, 10,
30Y
1 yr and under 32% 17% 5% 7%
3 21%
1 – 5 years 29% 32% 8% 29%
3 62%






Over 10 years 12% 3% 9% 30%
3 17%
Number of benchmarks 75137
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Number of original maturities 7866 n.a. 12
Original maturities





1, 2, 5, 10,
15, 30Y
6M,











1 yr and under 19% 10% 2% 4% n.a. 27%
1 – 5 years 6% 27% 32% 10% 23%





Over 10 years 32% 10% 5% 12% 37%
Number of benchmarks 2742 12 7
1    The number of original maturities in the US dropped to 7, after it stopped issuing 3-year securities in 1998.
2  Distribution is based on the volume outstanding. In calculating the component ratio, older issues out of the regular issue
cycle are excluded.  
3  Figures are for the remaining maturity, not for the original maturity.
5.2.2 Issue size and frequency of issues
The relationship between market liquidity and issue frequency is not simple. For a given amount of
overall issuance, the average issue size and frequency of new issues will be negatively correlated. On
the one hand, when issue frequency is low, i.e. particular issues remain on-the-run for a long time, the
average issue size is larger and the degree of fragmentation is low. However, prices of on-the-run
issues tend to deviate from par value, which some investors may not like. On the other hand, when
issue frequency is high, prices of on-the-run issues are close to the par value. However, the average
issue size is smaller thus the degree of market fragmentation is higher.
Among the countries surveyed, there seems to be a trend that issue frequency is lower when the
outstanding volume of government securities, a proxy for the financing needs of the government, is
small. This may be interpreted as the debt management authority of each country seeking to reduce
issue frequency so that average issue size is maintained or increased, probably because the authority
may be aware of the link between average issue size and liquidity in the government securities market.
As a reflection of such efforts, the number of issues and the volume outstanding are positively
correlated (see reference chart).
19 Index-linked bonds are not included in the table.15
Table 13
Features of issue size
CAN ITA JPN UK US
Volume outstanding (US$ billion)
1 285 1,100 1,919 458 3,457
Number of issues 125 199 234 82 248
Average issue size (US$ billion)
1 2.3 5.5 8.2 5.6 13.9
Issue frequency (times a year)
2 0.5 - 2 1 – 4 12 0.5 - 1 3 – 12
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Volume outstanding (US$ billion)
1 232 551 563 176 111 35
Number of issues 138 n.a. 115 50 28 46
Average issue size (US$ billion)
1 1.7 n.a. 4.9 3.5 4.0 0.8
Issue frequency (times a year)
2 Not fixed n.a. 2 - 4 2 Not fixed Not fixed
1  The figures are for the end of 1997, in billions of US dollars, converted at 1997 year-end exchange rates of end-1997
(US$1 = US$1.43 = ITL1,770 = ¥130 = BEF37.1 = FFr6.02 = DM1.80 = Dfl2.03 = SKr7.93 = SFr1.46, £1 = US$1.65).
2  Figures are given for original maturities where benchmarks exist, except for maturities of 1 year or less.
<reference chart>
5.2.3 Reopening system
Reopenings are conducted in ten of the eleven surveyed countries, i.e. only Japan does not have a
reopening system.
20 However, while the general purpose of reopening is to increase the fungibility of
benchmark issues, the rationale behind reopenings seems to differ for the US from the nine other
countries (Canada, Italy, the UK, Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland).
First, in the nine other countries, reopenings are conducted to increase issue size given dealers’ limited
subscription capacity. By creating an issue with several consecutive auctions instead of creating an
issue with one auction, the authorities can expect larger benchmark issues and a lesser degree of
market fragmentation, without taking a risk of paying risk premia to dealers who have to subscribe to
large amounts of securities at one time.
20 Some countries reopen issues for market surveillance purposes. Such reopenings are discussed later in section 6.
Reopenings are also conducted to smooth out government receipts throughout the year, but such reopenings are not
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Second, in the US, reopenings are conducted to increase the issue size of benchmark T-bills even
though there is no problem in their subscription capacity. In the US, all benchmark 3-month bills are
reopened 6-month bills, and one in four benchmark 6-month bills are reopened 1-year bills, because 6-
month bills are created weekly while 1-year bills are created every four weeks.
Table 14
Reopening for creating an issue
CAN ITA JPN UK US
Reopening for creating an issue Yes Yes No Yes Yes
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Reopening for creating an issue Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5.2.4 Strippability
Stripping is the process of separating a coupon bond into its individual coupon and principal
repayments, which can then be separately held and traded as zero coupon bonds. By doing so,
investors can construct their portfolios to fit their needs. In this sense, strippability can enlarge the
investor base, which enhances market liquidity. Among the surveyed countries, government securities
can be stripped in all countries except Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland.
However, it must be noted that, holding the total financing needs of the government constant, the
introduction of stripped bonds may reduce the net supply of coupon bonds, which could eventually
increase the level of market fragmentation. In order to cope with this problem, several countries (the
UK, Belgium, and Germany) have synchronized the timing of coupon payments to be unrelated to
original maturities so that coupons of different maturities can be fungible.
Table 15
Features of strippability
CAN ITA JPN UK US
Strippability Yes Yes
1 No Yes Yes
Perfect synchronization of coupon
payment dates No No No Yes No
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Strippability Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Perfect synchronization of coupon
payment dates Yes No Yes
2) No No No
1  From July 1998.  
2  For strippable bonds (10 and 30-years).
5.3 Fragmentation by holder profile
Holder profile also affects the level of market fragmentation. For example, if some securities are held
by market participants who do not sell securities once acquired, total outstanding volume would
effectively be divided between volume held by such holders and volume held by active traders.
Another example is, if securities are held by a certain type of market participant who reacts differently
to new incoming information, total outstanding volume would effectively be divided according to the
type of holder. Such division in total outstanding volume may lead to fragmentation in the market.17
The first example may apply to holdings by the government and/or the central bank, whereas the
second example may apply to holdings by non-residents.
5.3.1 Holdings by the government and/or the central bank
When the government and/or the central bank holds a large portion of the outstanding volume, the
government securities market becomes fragmented, assuming that the government and/or the central
bank do not sell securities once acquired. This fragmentation may lead to a decrease in the volume of
securities actually tradable in the private sector (effective supply).
This is not the only effect of holding by the government and/or the central bank. Because they usually
do not reveal their holding volume of securities issue by issue, market participants are unable to know
the exact volume available in the private sector for a certain issue. This makes it difficult for market
participants to precisely value securities, because the price of a security is partly determined by the
security’s supply and demand conditions. This may involve the further possibility that, in certain
situations when the risk of short-squeeze is high, dealers may be inclined to stop quoting to protect
themselves from being squeezed, because they do not know the volume of available securities.
Among the surveyed countries, the holding share of the government or central bank is highest in
Japan, followed by Sweden. In other countries, the holding share is generally less than 10%.
Table 16
Holdings of marketable securities by the government or central bank
CAN ITA JPN UK US
Holdings by the government 4.5% 0.1% 35.8% 0.0%
Holdings by the central bank 5.3% 7.6% 10.5%
3.6%
13.1%
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Holdings by the government 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 21.4%




5.3.2 Holdings of non-residents
The holding share of non-residents could affect the level of market fragmentation. This is because
non-residents, who usually hold government securities of a certain country in the context of global
portfolio allocation, tend to have different risk exposure than residents, or domestic investors, and thus
react differently to new incoming information than residents. In addition, the different reactions may
also stem from the differences in how they interpret and digest the incoming information. If securities
held by non-residents behave differently than securities held by residents, the market may be
fragmented between holdings of residents and non-residents.
While the relationship between market liquidity and holding share of non-residents is unclear, it may
be said that heterogeneous reactions to incoming information lead to better functioning of the market,
particularly enhancing the robustness of the market, because when market participants react
heterogeneously, it is easier to find counterparties to execute trades.
Among the surveyed countries, the holding share of non-residents is highest in the US, indicating the
highly international investor base. The share is lowest in Japan, which may be a product of





Holdings of non-residents 25.0% 22.5% 10% 14.4% 36.9%
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Holdings of non-residents 23.0% 12.9% n.a. 24.0% 19.5% n.a.
1  Estimated.
5.4. Fragmentation by institutional framework
5.4.1. Tax
Generally speaking, taxes reduce the expected return of trading and holding securities. In particular,
transaction taxes reduce the incentive to trade by creating a wedge between supply-prices and demand-
prices. In this sense, taxes clearly reduce market liquidity. In addition, different taxation treatment
according to the type of holder and security also reduces market liquidity by further fragmenting the
market.
Withholding taxes exist in more than half of the surveyed countries: Italy, Japan, Belgium, France,
Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland. In Italy, Belgium, France and Sweden, only personal investors,
such as households, are generally subject to the tax, therefore it seems that most active traders in the
market do not have to factor in the tax burden. However, in Japan only designated financial
institutions are tax-exempt, and in Switzerland, no one is tax-exempt.
21 In these countries, market
fragmentation may occur due to the different tax treatment of various market participants. In Japan, it
is said that market fragmentation exists between non-taxable bonds and taxable bonds.
Transaction taxes exist in Belgium and Switzerland.
22 In Belgium, the transaction tax is only levied on
households. In Switzerland, the tax does not apply to the dealing book of traders. Such tax treatment in




Although there is no definite conclusion for the relationship between particular accounting practices
and market liquidity, it is safe to say that a market will be more fragmented if different accounting
treatments are imposed according to the type of holder, holding purposes, and the status (listed or
unlisted) of bonds on exchanges. In general, securities priced far from their par value may be avoided
by market players who adopt historical cost accounting where they have to recognize redemption gains
and losses.
The market is fragmented between listed and unlisted securities in Japan where listed securities (10
and 20-year bonds) are valued by either historical-cost, lower-of-the-cost-or-market, or mark-to-
market method according to the type of holders, while unlisted securities (securities other than 10 and
20-year bonds) must be valued by the historical cost method.
21 The Japanese government announced that non-residents will be exempt from the withholding tax after September 1999, if
they meet certain conditions.
22 In Japan, the transaction tax was abolished by end-March, 1999.
23 Important issues on financial accounting are discussed here. However, from the viewpoint of market liquidity, issues on
managerial accounting such as a performance evaluation system of traders may also be important.19
Table 18
Taxation rules
(Y – exists, N – not exists)




2 N N Transaction tax
Futures NNN
2 N N
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Withholding tax YYYNYY
Cash YN
3 NNNY Transaction tax
Futures NNN-N N
1  After April 1998.  
2  The tax was abolished by the end of March, 1999.  
3  Although transaction taxes exists in the
exchange, their share on the exchange is only 2%.
Table 19
Accounting practice
H – historical cost, L – lower of the cost or market, M – mark to market
CAN ITA JPN UK US
Dealers MH ,  LMMM Holder
investors MH ,  L H, L, M M H, M
Hold to maturity -H-- H
Available for
sale - - - - M
Purpose
Short-term
trading - L - - M
Security Listed -H ,  L H, L, M M H, M
Unlisted M-H--
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Dealers H, M H, L, M LH ,  M H, M H, L, M Holder
investors H, M H, L LH H, L L
Hold to maturity HH H, M HH
Available for sale L L
Purpose
Short-term trading H, M M H, M M, L L, M
Listed H, M H, L, M LH ,  M H, L, M H, L, M Security
Unlisted L H, L, M20
6. Extraction of information
One expected attribute of government securities markets is that central banks derive information on
market expectations for future interest rates from yield curves. In order to derive accurate information,
a smooth and fitted yield curve is needed.
In addition, central banks need tools to precisely extract information from yield curves. Historically,
central banks relied on the price information of conventional coupon bonds. However, it was not very
easy to extract expectations for the real interest rate. In addition, central banks must mathematically
eliminate the coupon effect in order to estimate the zero coupon rate. Under such circumstances,
index-linked bonds and stripped coupons function as new tools to extract information more accurately.
Table 20
Features of index-linked bonds
CAN ITA JPN UK US
Original maturity 30-year - -V a r i o u s 10, 30-year
1
Volume outstanding (US$ billion) 5.9 - - 51.9 33.0
Ratio in total volume 2.1% - - 11.3% 1.0%
Number of issues 2--1 32
Method of issue Uniform-price





Choice of index CPI - -C P I CPI
Indexing of cashflows Capital-
indexed






Length of lag 3 months - - 8 months 3 months
BEL FRA
4 GER NEL SWE SWI
Original maturity - 11-year -- Various -
Volume outstanding (US$ billion) -3 . 3-- 11.4 -
Ratio in total volume -n a-- 10.3% -
Number of issues -1--5-
Method of issue - Syndicatio
n - - Tap -
Choice of index -C P I-- CPI -









Length of lag - 3 months -- 2-3months -
1  In 1998, the US started to issue 30-year bonds, but stopped to issue 5-year bonds.  
2  In November 1998, the method of
issue changed from tap to uniform-price auction.  
3  Principal repayment is the product of the bond’s nominal value and
cumulative changes in the index. Coupon payments equal the fixed coupon rate times the inflation-adjusted principal
amount.  
4  In September 1998, France started to issue index-linked bonds.  
5  Principal repayment is adjusted for inflation.21
6.1 Index-linked bonds
Central banks can theoretically estimate expected inflation rates by observing the yield differential
between index-linked bonds and ordinary coupon bonds. Although the initial purpose of introducing
index-linked bonds may be to reduce the government’s debt funding costs, they are issued in almost
half of the surveyed countries (Canada, the UK the US, France, and Sweden) and are utilized, to some
extent, as a tool to extract information.
6.2 Stripped bonds
Another way to extract information from yield curves is to use the rates on the strips. When stripped,
one on-the-run 10-year coupon bond becomes 21 zero coupon bonds composed of one principal and
20 coupon strips when coupons are paid semi-annually. Central banks can derive zero coupon rates
directly from each of the 21, without having to consider the coupon effects of conventional coupon
bonds.
7. Market surveillance
A manipulation-free market surely leads to active market participation by dealers and investors. As the
base of market participants expands, market liquidity is all the more enhanced. In this sense, adequate
market surveillance is necessary for a deep and liquid market.
In the secondary market, several measures are taken to reduce expected profits by attempting market
manipulations such as short squeezes. One approach, taken by all countries except Japan and
Germany, is to formulate rules and practices for delivery fails. This facilitates short-sales of securities
by dealers, increasing market depth. The other approach is to increase the availability of securities by
lending and reopening securities. Italy, the UK, the US, Belgium, Germany, and Sweden have a
securities lending scheme allowing central banks to lend securities which are in short-supply. Also,
nearly half of the surveyed countries (Canada, Italy, the UK, the US, and Belgium) are prepared to
reopen any security when market integrity is challenged. In practice, there have been few occasions
when the authorities actually reopened securities for this purpose.
In the primary market, nearly half of the surveyed countries (Canada, Japan, the UK, the US, France)
have bidding or allocation limits in auctions, in order to prevent concentration of securities with a
certain dealer. This measure can improve market liquidity by contributing not only to preventing
attempts to corner the market, but also by diversifying the profile of security holders.22
Table 21
Features of market surveillance
CAN ITA JPN UK US
Rules / practices for fails Yes
1 Yes
1 No Yes Yes
1
Securities lending / repo to
prevent squeeze
No Yes No Yes Yes
Reopening to prevent squeeze Yes Yes No Yes Yes




No No Yes Yes Yes
BEL FRA GER NEL SWE SWI
Rules / practices for fails Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Securities lending / repo to
prevent squeeze Yes No Yes No Yes No
Reopening to prevent squeeze Yes No No No No No
Bidding limit No No No - 
2 No No Auction
procedure
Allocation
limit No Yes No - 
2
No No
1  While official rules for delivery fails do not exist, clear practices have been established among market players.  
2  Issues
are created by tap-issuance, not by auctions.
<reference> Dattels, Peter, “The Microstructure of Government Securities Markets”, IMF Working Paper, November 1995